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THE EMERGENCE OF METROPOLITAN
CENTERS AS LITIGATION CENTERS
FOR THE "BIG CASE":
NEW CONCEPTS IN FEDERAL AND STATE
COURT JURISDICTION
By KEVIN M. FoRDE*
During this century most American commerce, like the majority of our population, has clustered in the great metropolitan
centers. These centers host a vast array of commercial entities
which, with their technological and organizational genius, have
brought about such modern phenomena as the jet transport and
the conglomerate corporate enterprise. These innovations, in
turn, have given rise to modern legal phenomena such as mass
catastrophe litigation and complex commercial cases which are
described by the Judicial Conference of the United States as
"protracted cases.":, With such litigation-producing enterprises
centralizing in our urban centers it is inevitable that these cities
will also develop as great litigation centers. These centers should
expedite and facilitate the disposition of litigation primarily
through economical consolidation of related actions.
The following example is illustrative of the application of
the litigation center concept and its advantages.
On March 5, 1966, a Boeing 707 jet liner, operated by a
British airlines, en route from Tokyo, Japan, to Hong Kong,
China, crashed on the eastern slope of Mt. Fuji, Japan, approximately 50 miles from Tokyo. In the litigation that followed,
thirty-two cases, representing the claims of the next of kin of
sixty-four decedents from no less than fifteen states, all filed
2
suit in Chicago, Illinois in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
After substantial pretrial discovery the cases were settled.
*B.S. Marquette University, J.D. Loyola University, member of the

Illinois Bar, instructor, The John Marshall Law School.
1See

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE REPORT -

PROCEDURE IN ANTI-TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES (1953), 13 F.R.D.
62 (1953); PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON PROTRACTED CASES FOR UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT JUDGES, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957); HANDBOOK OF
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES, 25 F.R.D.

351 (1960); Procedural Devices for Simplifying Litigation Stemming from
a Mass Tort, 63 YALE L. J. 493 (1954).
2 Vanderwall v. Boeing Co. & British Overseas Airways Corp., 66L-4429
(Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill., dismissed Mar. 14, 1967).
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The thought of these numerous citizens from foreign states
bringing suit in Chicago, Illinois against a British air carrier
and a Washington aircraft manufacturer, for injuries that occurred in Japan may be bewildering to those attuned to traditional principles of forum selection. Yet the defendants did not
challenge the jurisdiction of the court over their persons or the
convenience of the forum. Both were apparently willing to litigate the matter in Chicago in order to dispose of the controversies in what was basically one proceeding. Assumedly, the
respective plaintiffs were also pleased with the result as they
had selected the forum and the grouping of the many cases undoubtedly reduced litigation expenses with a corresponding increase in net recovery. Thus, from the standpoint of overall
judicial adiministration and economy, the litigation reached a
laudable objective. One court summarily disposed of cases
which could have involved considerable work for many courts.
Unfortunately, expedient disposition of the protracted case
in a litigation center equipped to facilitate such disposition, as
experienced in the Mt. Fuji litigation, is the exception rather
than the rule. In the normal protracted case individual actions
are separately filed and disposed of in a number of cities and
a number of courts hear basically the same suit. Objections to
jurisdiction, venue, and the convenience of the forum are generally raised in each of the many already overburdened courts.
The development of the metropolitan litigation center has
been retarded primarily by jurisdictional limitations of the state
and federal courts. Constitutionally, a state must have some
interest in, or contact with, a controversy before it may exert
judicial authority over it.8 These state-court limitations have
generally been respected by the federal courts as a natural application of the Erie doctrine.4 The extent to which a court is
willing, and permitted by constitution and statute, to exert jurisdiction is obviously crucial to the potential development of a
litigation center.
Recent federal legislation, offered and adopted as a partial
solution to the "big case" problem in the state and federal courts,
and certain state court decisions indicate a tendency to expand
the jurisdictional limitations of state and federal courts. Principles of venue and the convenience of the forum which also
determine the available situs for litigation are similarly being
adjusted to meet modern litigation needs. To illustrate the state
court developments two states, Illinois and New York, are em3 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See PersonalJurisdiction
Over Foreign Corporationsin Diversity Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights

of Erie, 31 U. CI. L. REV. 752 (1964).
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phasized, both of which contain litigation centers and enjoy
reputations for progressive law making.
THE JURISDICTION CONCEPT AND ITS BACKGROUND

In 1877, the United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer V.
Neff5 embraced the "physical presence" concept of jurisdiction.,
In that case a personal action had been brought in an Oregon
court, the non-resident defendant having been served by publication only. After judgment for plaintiff the defendant's Oregon land was sold by sheriff's sale causing the title to be transferred. Reversing the judgment, the Court held that personal
jurisdiction over a defendant could only be obtained by personal
service of process within the state, reasoning:
[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory. . . . The other
principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned;

that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdictionand authority
over persons or property without its territory. . . . The several
States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence
of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is
laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of

one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far
as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can

extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either
7
persons or property to its decisions.

Thus, the presence of a defendant's property within the state
did not empower the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over
him, although it did confer upon the state power over his property (in rem jurisdiction) if properly invoked.
595 U.S. 714 (1877).

6 The physical presence concept of in personam jurisdiction is largely
an outgrowth of medieval theories of "sovereignty" and "physical power."
The physical power doctrine can be traced to the allegiance or fidelity a subject owed the sovereign.
Each subject directly submitted to the regal power of the sovereign or
did so indirectly through submission to an intermediate lord. There
existed an implied, if not express, covenant between the individual and
his sovereign. The individual obtained lands, protection and other benefits from the sovereign or intermediate lord; in return the individual
provided services and payments. The king or lord had large areas of
control over the enfoeffed vassel. He could, among other things, demand submission of the individual to the adjudication of legal relations
with himself or with others in court.
Johnston, The Fallacy of Physical Power, 1 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 37,
44 (1967). Jurisdiction based on this theory operated justly and conveniently at that time since the population was stable rather than mobile
as it is today, subjects often spending their whole lives within the territorial
boundaries of one sovereign. Even the occasional transient, although owing
no allegiance to a sovereign, was presumed to have requested and accepted
the protection and benefits of the sovereign so long as he was within his
territory. Id. at 45. These early feudal theories were apparently commingled with equally restrictive European theories advocated for adoption by
American courts by Justice Story. Hazard, A General Theory of StateCourt Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241. Professor Hazard attributes
the origin of the Story principles to continental sources, particularly the
Dutch jurist Huber.
795 U.S. at 722 (emphasis added).
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[T]he State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated
within its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of the
demand of its own citizens against them; and the exercise of this
jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the
State where the owners are domiciled. 8

Under Pennoyer, a plaintiff could first proceed by attachment
against a defendant's property located within the state; after
attachment a personal judgment in an amount equal to the value
of that property would not offend the state territorial sovereignty concept.
If for no other reason, Pennoyer must be admired for its
inflexible simplicity and ease of application. One was either
present within the state - as evidenced by service of process and was therefore under the physical power of the court, or he
was not.9 The same held true for disputes concerning property.
Property was either located within the state's borders and subject to its judicial power, or was not. Even the complexities of
corporate enterprise did not disrupt this simple approach. Jurisdiction over a corporation (which did not "exist" outside
the borders of the state of its incorporation) 10 depended upon
establishing both the corporation's presence by its conducting
business, and the availability of an agent for the acceptance of
process." In the absence of either, a corporation could send its
products, contracts and corporate securities into a state, or operate its trains, buses and aircraft within a state and would
not be "present" in terms of jurisdiction, and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of that state's courts.
The over-simplification of this approach becomes apparent
when applied to the protracted case which generally involves a
number of defendants, some of whom are physically and continuously present within the state, and others who are not, with
no state being available where all are physically and continuously
2
present.'
For more than seventy years following the Pennoyer deci-

sion, the courts struggled within the unrealistic limitations imposed on jurisdiction, creating fictions of "consent" and "pres8

Id. at 723. See 95 U.S. at 748 (dissenting opinion).

9Barry, Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 13 VA. L. REV. 175, 176-77
(1926); Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts Over Foreigners, 26 HARV. L.
REv. 283, 284-85 (1913).
10 Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
11 Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v.
Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913). See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due
Process Clause and The In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 569, 598 (1958).
12 For a discussion of these problems see articles cited note 1 supra.
Parenthetically, the physical power doctrine may operate not only to deprive

a court of appropriate jurisdiction, but might also vest jurisdiction quite
inappropriately, when, for example, a traveler fortuitously enters or even
flies above the physical borders of the state. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F.
Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
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ence" in order to avoid the literal effects of the decision and
meet the practical realities of a rapidly changing society.' 3 In
1945, apparently frustrated with the fictions it was forced to employ, the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 4 rejected the territorial sovereignty doctrine as it applied
to in personam actions."5
In InternationalShoe, the Court candidly acknowledged the
impracticality of its "physical power" doctrine, and held that
continuous physical presence would no longer be essential where
the defendant had "certain minimum contacts" with the jurisdiction:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in
personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's
person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of
a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally
binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733.

But now that

the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he

be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'16
In conceiving its new "fairness" or "minimum contacts"
test, the Court set forth a number of factors to be considered in
determining whether, in a particular case, the demands of due
process were met:
Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context

of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to
defend the particular suit which is brought there. An 'estimate
of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from
a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this connection ...

'Presence' in the state in this sense has never been doubted
when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on
.

. .

. Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual

presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or
isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf
are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected
with the activities there.'1
In weighing the delicate balance of its "fairness" test, the
Court plainly recognized that:
13E.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Hess v. Pawloski,

274 U.S. 352 (1927).
14 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

5For a discussion of this historical development see Kurland, The Su-

preme Court, The Due Process Clause and The In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. CH. L. REV. 569 (1958).
16 326 U.S. at 316.

17Id. at 317.
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[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities. ....
Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional
acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability on the corporation has not been thought to
confer upon the state authority to enforce it . . . other such acts,
because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their
commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation
liable to suit.' 8

In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court further demonstrated its awareness of the realities of twentieth century life
and its willingness to interpret the state courts' jurisdictional
limitations in a manner consistent with these realities. In McGee
V. InternationalLife Insurance Co., 19 for example, the Court held
that the mailing of a single life insurance policy into the State
of California subjected the insurer to the jurisdiction of the
California courts. Justice Black, writing for the Court, noted
the necessities which required the expansion of state court jurisdiction in our changing economy:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In
part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization
of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.20
ILLINOIS AND THE FAIRNESS TEST

On the impetus of International Shoe, and in order to reap
its full benefits, many states amended their statutes concerning

personal jurisdiction. Illinois, in the forefront, enacted the
present section 17 of its Civil Practice Act,21 which became, with
l8 Id. at 318.
19 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
20 Id.
at 222-23.
Within a year after the McGee decision, a closely divided (five to four)
Court decided Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), often cited as authority for limiting the broad application of McGee and a step back toward
the territorial sovereignty concept. However, Hanson involved peculiar
facts concerning probate and trust administration, and should be of no avail
to a defendant attempting to avoid jurisdiction in a forum where he is actually doing business. In fact, the Hanson opinion emphasized the defendant's lack of voluntary contact with the forum and restated the principles
of McGee, indicating that Hanson may have no application in cases involving a commercial enterprise voluntarily doing business, however minimal,
in the forum state.
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §17 (1967).
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the liberal interpretation afforded it by the Illinois
Supreme
22
Court, the most progressive enactment of its kind.
With the adoption of this section ... Illinois has expanded the

in personam jurisdiction of its courts to the limits permitted
under
2
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
In its first opportunity to construe the statute, the Illinois Supreme Court exhibited the same progressive initiative. 24 And,
although there was one regressive interval,25 the Illinois court, in
Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation,26 produced what stood for years as the most forward looking decision in the field of extra-territorial jurisdiction. In
Gray, an Ohio manufacturer sold a valve to an assembler in
Pennsylvania where it was incorporated in a water heater which
was eventually shipped into Illinois where it exploded injuring
an Illinois resident. The court held that the Ohio manufacturer
was subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois.
In discussing the developments of the law since Pennoyer,
the Illinois court noted the impracticalities of applying a seventeenth century doctrine to twentieth century commerce:
The relevant decisions since Pennoyer v. Neff show a development

of the concept of personal jurisdiction from one which requires
service of process within the State to one which is satisfied either
if the act or transaction sued on occurs there or if defendant has
engaged in a sufficiently substantial course of activity in the State,
provided always that reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard

are afforded. As the Vermont court recognized in the Smyth case,
the trend in defining due process of law is away from the emphasis
on territorial limitations and toward emphasis on providing ade-

quate notice and opportunity to be heard: from the court with immediate power over the defendant, toward the court27 in which both
parties can most conveniently settle their dispute.
Since the Gray decision, the Illinois courts have continued to
exert jurisdiction based on the most minimal
of contacts, em28
phasizing the practicalities of each situation.
THE LONG ARM OF NEW YORK

The New York experience is a particularly interesting study
of the development of "long arm" jurisdiction. In the period
which saw Illinois progress from International Shoe to Gray,
New York was unable to formulate a modern practice act provision on jurisdiction. Although, as early as 1958, the New York
22

See Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533.

23 Historical & Practice Notes following ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §17
(Smith-Hurd 1956).
24 See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
25 Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill.2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959).
26 22 I1l.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
2 Id. at 440-41, 176 N.E.2d at 765.
28 Gordon v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,

273 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill.
1967) ; Ziegler v. Hodges, 80 Ill. App. 2d 210, 224 N.E.2d 12 (1967) ; Koplin v.
Thomas, Haab & Thomas, 73 Ill. App. 2d 242, 219 N.E.2d 646 (1966).
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Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure had drafted a
proposal modeled after the Illinois Act, the new provisions were
not in effect until September of 1963.29 Even with the benefit
of the Illinois experience, the effect of the 1963 New York Act
was anything but certain, particularly with regard to a provision which subjected one to the jurisdiction of New York courts
upon his "commission of a tortious act," within the state, a crucial provision in the products liability field.30
The New York Court of Appeals had equal difficulty in determining the breadth of the "tortious act provisions" of the2
3 and Singer v. Walker,.
=
new statute. In Feathers V. McLucas
the first cases to come before it, the court, after a thorough discussion of the Illinois experience, particularly Gray, rejected the
Illinois approach in favor of a more limited exercise of jurisdiction. In Feathers, a tank truck, manufactured in Kansas by
the defendant Kansas corporation, was sold to a Missouri corporation which completed its assembly before reselling it to a
Pennsylvania corporation. The latter, an interstate carrier, used
the truck in a number of eastern states, including New York.
The truck exploded in New York injuring plaintiff, a New York
resident. In Singer, a geologist's hammer, manufactured by defendant in Illinois and labelled unbreakable, was shipped to New
York where it was purchased from a New York dealer and given
to the infant (ten-year-old) plaintiff, a resident of New York.
While on a brief field trip in Connecticut, the hammer proved
faulty causing injury to plaintiff. Had the New York court
adopted the rationale of Gray, it would have had little difficulty
holding the defendants in both cases subject to its jurisdiction.
The New York Court of Appeals rejected Gray, however, in favor of a more limited view of its jurisdiction.
Chief Judge Desmond strongly disagreed with the limitations imposed on the statute in these cases:
The statutory language (302, subd. [a], par. 2), 'commits a
tortious act within the state', is taken verbatim from Illinois law
(Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, §17).

.

.

. When our Legislature adopted

the language of the Illinois Legislature it presumably adopted with
it the construction given the statutory language by the Illinois
court in Gray. .. 3
29 Law of April 4, 1962, ch. 308, §302, [1962] Laws of N.Y. 615, as
amended, N.Y. CPLR §302 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
30 1.
J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
§§302.01, 302.10a (1967) suggests that the New York provision, unlike that
of Illinois, was not intended to reach the limits of constitutional power. But
see Practice Commentary following N.Y. CPLR §302 (McKinney 1963);
Tortious Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases, 33
FORDIIAM L. REV. 671 (1965).

15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
905 (1965).
3 Id. at 470-71, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 29-30 (concurring
opinion).
31
3
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Unable to convince his brothers, Chief Judge Desmond apparently took his case to the Judicial Conference. Primarily on
the recommendation of the Judicial Conference Report, ' 4 the
1966 legislature enacted the present section 302(a) (3) of the
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,35 which specifically authorized the exercise of jurisdiction over non-residents who had
caused injury within New York through the commission of tortious acts outside New York, as long as the non-resident could
foresee possible harm in New York or the defendant carried on
6
substantial business in New York.
Despite the provincial tendencies of the New York Court
of Appeals in construing the "tortious act provision," it was extremely liberal in its construction of other provisions of the Act,
particularly that provision which authorized the exertion of
jurisdiction over those who transact any business within the
state.3 7 In fact, in the Singer case, though the court failed to
find a "tortious act" committed within the state, it did find that
the defendant's substantial shipment of products into the state
was sufficient to satisfy the transaction of business provision
and subjected defendant to its jurisdiction on that basis. Al34

1966

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND

RULES, [1966] Laws of N.Y. 2780.

In the light of the Feathers decision, it is clear that amendment of
CPLR 302 (a) (2) is necessary if legal protection is to be accorded
to New York residents who are injured within the state by foreign tortfeasors who cannot be reached through implementation of the transaction of business clause.
CPLR 302(a) (2) does not reach a non-resident who causes
tortious injury in the state by an act or omission without the state.

In view of this serious gap in the coverage afforded by CPLR
302 (a) (2) the Judicial Conference believes that an amendment is required which will be broad enough to protect New York residents yet
not so broad as to burden unfairly non-residents whose connection with
the state is remote and who could not reasonably be expected to foresee
that their acts outside of New York could have harmful consequences in
New York.
Id. at 2786-88.
3 N.Y. CPLR §302 (a) (3)
(McKinney Supp. 1967), which reads in
part:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action
arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor
or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce ...
36
3 7 Id.
Id. at (a) (1).
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though the injury occurred in Connecticut, the cause of action
arose from "the purposeful activities engaged in by the [defendant] in this State in connection with the sale of its products
in the New York market."3 8
The court of appeals further expressed its willingness to
exercise jurisdiction under the "doing business" criteria in
Bryant V. Finnish National Airline.39 In that case, a stewardessemployee of Trans World Airlines, who was a resident of New
York, was injured through the alleged negligence of a Finnish
airline at Orly Airport, Paris, France. The defendant did not
operate any aircraft within the United States and was not qualified to do business in New York. The New York office accepted
reservations for Finnair flights in Europe, but did not sell tickets or receive payment for fares. Finding the "doing business"
test a "simple pragmatic one," the court concluded that the defendant had had sufficient contacts with New York so as to be
"doing business" there and hence answerable to its courts for
any cause of action, even if unrelated to its New York activities.
Illinois courts have expressed equal willingness to exert
jurisdiction over defendants doing business in that state, even
when the alleged cause of action neither arises from nor is in
any way related to the defendants' activities there. In the recent federal district court case of Gordon v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.,4 0 Judge Hubert L. Will stated that:
". .. Illinois has confirmed that it wishes to exercise all possible
bases of jurisdiction which are consistent with the due process
clause."' 4'

The court then held that the mere solicitation of

business in Illinois subjected the corporate defendant to the
jurisdiction of Illinois courts for claims completely unrelated to
the soliciting activities.
The propensity of the New York and Illinois courts to exert
jurisdiction on such minimal contacts, opens the doors of those
courts to many suits which, under a more restrictive interpretation, could not be heard in those states. As a consequence of
this policy, any corporate defendant conducting any substantial
business in New York or Illinois may be sued in that state for
any claim, related or unrelated, arising anywhere in the world.
Thus, those states - more specifically the metropolitan areas
therein - may be established as litigation centers merely on the
basis of the great number of corporate defendants subject to
suit there by virtue of their business activities.
38

15 N.Y.2d at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).

38

15

40

273 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1967).

41 Id. at 168.
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THE ATTACHMENT GAME

While Pennoyer v. Neff limited the states' in personam jurisdiction to cases where the defendant was personally served
with process within the state, it also held that the presence of
property of the defendant within the state could have authorized
jurisdiction over the property. 42 This aspect of Pennoyer (in
rem jurisdiction, where the proceedings are instituted against
the property itself, and quasi in rem jurisdiction, where the
property is sought to satisfy personal claims against the defendant) is still viable law, apparently not having been affected
by InternationalShoe and its progeny. Considerable expansion
of the judicial powers of the states, particularly those which
contain a metropolitan center where many insurance companies
are based, may result from employment of the full potential of
this aspect of jurisdiction.
The New York Court of Appeals exploited this potential in
Seider v. Roth,43 where plaintiff, a resident of New York, was
injured in an automobile collision on a highway in Vermont,
allegedly through the negligence of defendant, a resident of
Quebec. Ignoring conventional concepts of jurisdiction which
would have required the action to have been brought in Vermont
or Quebec, the plaintiff sought jurisdiction over the defendant
in New York by attaching property of the defendant in New
York. The property attached was a debt due defendant, a contractual obligation of his insurance company to defend and indemnify him. The insurer did business in New York and was
thereby amenable to process there. The lower courts refused
to vacate the attachment. The court of appeals, Chief Judge
Desmond writing for the majority of a divided (four to three)
court, affirmed the lower court's upholding of the attachment procedure.
Almost as surprising as the result in Seider was the ease
in which it was accomplished. Indeed, the court only saw one
issue: "The whole question . . .is whether [the insurance com-

pany's] contractual obligation to [defend] is a debt or cause of
action such as may be attached. '' 44

International Shoe, and,

in fact, the whole question of "contacts" and due process were
not mentioned; the constitutional questions were apparently
5

never raised.4

Actually, the Seider decision should have come as no surprise to those familiar with In re Riggle4 6 decided by the same
42See text following note 7 supra.
43 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
44Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
45 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vaage, 265 F. Supp. 556, 561-62 (S.D.

N.Y. 1967).
4"11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
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court four years earlier. That case resulted from an automobile
accident in Wyoming in which an Illinois resident, Robert Riggle, the would-be defendant, was killed. The conventional forums were Wyoming, where the accident occurred, or Illinois,
where Riggle's estate was being administered. The unconventional plaintiff, a resident of New York, opened ancillary administration of Riggle's estate in New York. While ancillary
administration may only be commenced within a state in which
the deceased has left real or personal property, the only property
left by Riggle in New York was the personal obligation of an
indemnity insurance carrier which was doing business in New
York. The Court of Appeals of New York upheld jurisdiction
based on these factors.
On the theory of these two decisions a plaintiff may sue most
defendants in most large cities in which their insurance carriers
are doing business regardless of the situs of the occurrence or
the residence of the defendant tort-feasor. The recovery, however, is limited to the value of the property, i.e., the coverage of
the insurance policy.
The Riggle decision relied on Furst v. Brady,47 a 1941 Illinois decision granting identical relief. In the Illinois case the
accident occurred in Illinois, but there is no indication in the
opinion that that fact was controlling, and furthermore, the case
was decided years before the Illinois "long arm statute" 48 was
enacted.
Later Illinois Appellate Court decisions 49 have limited the
application of the Furst case to situations where the accident
occurred in Illinois, thereby ignoring the opportunity to expand
their jurisdiction through the use of the insurance policy attachment device. Illinois does, however, have an attachment statute
which allows quasi in rem jurisdiction in tort actions against
50
non-residents.
SEIDER V. ROTH AND THE FAIRNESS TEST
OF INTERNATIONAL SHOE
The Seider decision was met by a flurry of commentary,
most of which challenged its constitutional validity.5 1 The Court
47
375 111. 425, 31 N.E.2d 606 (1940).
48
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §17 (1967).
49 Hinshaw v. Johnson, 19 Ill.
App. 2d 239, 153 N.E.2d 422 (1958) ; In re
Lawson, 18 Ill.
App. 2d 586, 153 N.E.2d 87 (1958); Shirley v. Shirley, 834
Ill. App. 590, 80 N.E.2d 99 (1948).
50

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11 §§1, 8 (1967).

51 Supplementary Practice Commentary following N.Y. CPLR §5201
(McKinney Supp. 1967); Reese, The Expanding Scope of JurisdictionOver
Non-Residents - New York Goes Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 118 (Jan. 1968;
Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 550 (1967); cf. Jurisdiction: Quasi In Rem
Jurisdiction Obtained By Attaching Obligations Under an Automobile Liability Policy, 51 MINN. L. REV. 158 (1966) ; Quasi In Ren JurisdictionBased
on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REV. 654 (1967).
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of Appeals of New York had an opportunity to answer these
challenges when lower appellate courts certified the question for
review in Simpson v. Loehman52 and Victor V. Lyon Associates,
Inc.53 The facts in Simpson were typical of the attachment cases.
A resident of New York was injured in Connecticut as a result
of the alleged negligence of a Connecticut resident. The defendant's insurer did business in New York. The facts in Victor
were not so typical. There, a resident of New York was injured
in a collision with defendant's truck in Da Nang, South Viet
Nam. Defendant, a Maryland corporation, did not do business
in New York. Its insurance policy was issued in Okinawa and
its coverage was limited to activities in Ryu Kyu Islands, Formosa, Japan, Thailand, Korea, South Viet Nam and Cambodia.
The insurer, Hanover Insurance Company, did business in New
York. The court disposed of both cases with its opinion in
Simpson. The defendants in these cases presented three constitutional arguments: First, that the attachment procedure offended due process; second, that it imposed an undue burden on
interstate commerce in the field of insurance; and third, that it
impaired the obligations of the contract of liability insurance.
The court devoted little discussion to the last two arguments
and concentrated on the due process question. In upholding the
attachment procedure of Seider v. Roth, the court stated:
It was our opinion when we decided that case, and it still is, that
jurisdiction was acquired by the attachment in view of the
fact that the policy obligation was a debt to the defendant. And
we perceive no denial of due process since the presence of that debt
in this State

.

. contingent or inchoate though it may be -

rep-

resents sufficient of a property right in the defendant to furnish
the nexus with, and the interest in, New York to empower its courts
to exercise an in rem jurisdiction over him.

.

.

. [S]uch value is

its face amount and not some abstract or hypothetical value,4
Within days after the Simpson decision was announced, a
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York disagreed with its constitutional holding25 The district
court's analysis began with the following accurate summary of
the holding of the New York Court of Appeals in Simpson:
The requisites necessary for in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction
are the presence of the res within the state, effective seizure, and
adequate notice to its owner. Judge Fuld found these requisites
present in Simpson for there was personal service upon the owner
of the debt and under the rule in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215,
227 . . . (1905), the situs of a debt follows the debtor and is sub-

ject to garnishment wherever the debtor may be found. As the
insurance company was doing business in New York the situs of
the debt was New York.
N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
53 21 N.Y.2d 695, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1967).
54 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 234 N.E.2d 669 ,671, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (1967).
5221

5 Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
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Judge Keating concurring in the opinion of the court expanded
upon the theme, also expressed by Judge Fuld, that the procedure
sanctioned in Seider v. Roth can be sustained on the ground that
the State of New York has a sufficient governmental interest in
accidents involving New York plaintiffs to legislate a direct action
statute. In Judge Keating's view the procedure in Seider v. Roth
accomplishes this result by compelling the insurer, the real party
defendant, to defend in this state provided it transacts business
here and is thus subject to the jurisdiction of the New York
courts."8
In concluding that the attachment procedure was unconstitutional, the court discussed quasi in rem concepts, emphasizing
the physical power doctrine and citing Pennoyer v. Neff, stated:
"As such it must be recognized that the authority of any tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
' '57
which it is functioning.
The district court then presented the practical dilemma
which, as to the constitutional question, it found controlling. If
the initial defendant (the insured) appeared, he might subject
himself to a judgment exceeding the policy limits.5 8 If he did
not appear, the insurer's attempted defense would have been
difficult if not impossible. Moreover, by refusing to appear and
cooperate, the insured might jeopardize his rights to a later
defense and to indemnity.
The New York Court of Appeals in Simpson considered the
problem of the insurance carrier and concluded that "realistically,
the insurer ...

is in full control of the litigation .

. .

.""

Cer-

tainly the insured would appear rather than run the risk of
losing the protection of his policy for failure to cooperate.
As to the possibility that the defendant might subject himself to liability in excess of the policy limits, in cases where "excess" exposure appears possible, the court might consider the
rights of that defendant by limiting its judgment to the policy
limits. Further, a hardship imposed by defending in a forum
might also be considered pursuant to a motion to transfer to a
more convenient forum or to dismiss on the basis of forum non
conveniens. In most mass catastrophe or protracted commercial cases, the defendant will be a substantial commercial or
transportation entity and the selection of any one forum will
present no grave hardship.
56

Id. at 493.

Id. at 493-94.
The appearance to defend will be a personal appearance subjecting
the defendant to personal jurisdiction. N.Y. CPLR §320(c) (McKinney
Supp. 1967). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §20 (1967). However, the
court of appeals in Simpson specifically states that neither that decision nor
Seider authorizes any judgment in excess of the policy limits. 21 N.Y.2d 305,
310, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636-37.
59 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
57
58
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THE RESIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF

In Vaage v. Lewisf the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division limited the application of Seider and Simpson to
cases where the plaintiff was a New York resident. In refusing
to permit a Norwegian plaintiff to avail himself of its attachment procedure, the court stated that "[t]he only New York
contact is the rather tenuous fact that the defendant's insurance
company is authorized to do business in New York."'61 However,
the United States Supreme Court did not think "doing business" was so tenuous a fact in InternationalShoe. Also, Judge
Keating's opinion in Simpson stressed the fact that the defendant's insurance carrier was the real party in interest. Requiring insurance companies to respond in a state where they are
doing business certainly would not offend due process in the
eyes of the courts which decided Finnish Airway, Gordon and
Gray. More importantly, the court overlooked the basic nature
of the action - attachment - which is in rem or quasi in rem
where control over the property itself vests the court with
jurisdiction.
A number of cases dealing with in personam jurisdiction
under the "commission of a tort" provisions stress the residency
of the plaintiff,62 but there are a number of convincing arguments to rebut the claim that residency is crucial. 6 3 Residency
of the plaintiff should be of even less importance in a proceeding
which is basically in rem.
FUTURE OF THE ATTACHMENT PROCEDURE

Victor V. Lyon Associates, Inc.6 4 has been appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.6G Hopefully, the Supreme Court
will acknowledge jurisdiction in Victor and accept the opportunity to reassess the principles upon which state court jurisdiction is based.
In reassessing the limits on state court jurisdiction, the
Court should consider the following propositions.
First, the Court should consider whether it serves any purpose to continue the troublesome distinction between actions in
rem and in personam and whether the fairness test of Interna60 29 A.D.2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1968).
61 Id. at 316, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
62 See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il1.2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Tortious Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction in
Products Liability Cases, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 671, 695-96 (1965).
63See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935)
Tortious Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases, 33
FORDHAM L. REV. 671, 695-96 (1965).
64 21 N.Y.2d 695, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1967).
See text
at note 53 supra.
65 Appeal docketed, Hanover Ins. Co. v. Victor, sub nom., (U.S. March
28, 1968.) (No. 1273, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 50, 1968 Term).
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tional Shoe should be applied to in rem as well as in personam
actions. The primary distinction set forth in Pennoyer related
to the quality of notice required. This distinction has been
eliminated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions"6 which require, even for in rem actions, that "if feasible, notice must be
reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which
may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests." 67 The elimination of this distinction between the actions
and the application of the principles of International Shoe to
in rem and quasi in rem actions should not invalidate the attachment procedure. Property located within the state should in and
of itself have no independent jurisdictional significance, but it
does provide a "contact" with the state which under certain circumstances may authorize the exercise of state judicial power
consistent with the teachings of InternationalShoe.
In the insurance company cases, which make up the great
bulk of personal injury actions, the presence of the insurance
company doing business in the state and the presence of its
"debt" to the insured defendant should be adequate "contact"
to vest jurisdiction in the courts of that state. In Judge Keating's words, the attachment procedure merely recognizes "that
the real party in interest is the insurer. . . .'
" and is "a recognition of realities and not fictions." 9 In order to obviate all
fictions, the attachment game should be disregarded in favor of
a procedure which permits the insurer to be sued directly, though
not necessarily in its own name.
Many factors generally considered in jurisdiction cases
(i.e., the hardship imposed upon defendant; practical problems
in litigating at the forum selected; the residence of plaintiff;
and the location of the operational facts) should more properly
be presented in a motion to transfer or dismiss based on forum
non conveniens. It has been pursuasively argued that the jurisdictional limitations presently applied in state courts are actually an outgrowth of the forum non conveniens doctrine.7 0 In
this regard it should be noted that the federal statute providing
for transfer well facilitates such a transfer.7 1 The various states
should be urged to adopt interstate transfer provisions to cover
the circumstances of the inconvenient forum, without imposing
7 2
the hardship of dismissal.
66 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) ; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
67 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956).
68 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 313-14, 234 N.E.2d 669, 673, 287
N.Y.S.2d 633, 639 (1967).
(9Id. at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
70 Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956).
7128 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1964).
72 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 70; Johnston, supra note 6, at 58.

19681

Emergence of Metropolitan Centers as Litigation Centers

THE FEDERAL COURTS

The primary impetus in the attempts to consolidate mass
litigation, thus establishing the litigation center, has come from
the Federal Judiciary - particularly the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation - and from the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate. Due to the sponsorship of
the Senate Committee and the Federal Judiciary a number of
important innovations have been introduced and enacted into
law. Furthermore, a number of the impediments preventing
state court consolidation of actions are not present in the federal courts. As previously stated, when presented with cases
imposing hardship through inconvenience the federal statutes
provide for transfer 73 rather than dismissal, which is required
by state court procedures. Consolidation is further facilitated
by an intervention rule which permits additional parties to intervene with the approval of the court, whenever their "claim
or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. '' 74

In a multiparty case, additional parties may inter-

vene in the first filed action rather than commence a new one.
Many questions of jurisdiction, venue, adequacy of service and
convenience of the forum are thus avoided and consolidation is
achieved voluntarily.
This is not to suggest that all possible progress has been
made in the federal courts. Again, as stated earlier, federal
courts have generally observed the limitations of state court
jurisdiction as a natural result of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins'7 though it may be convincingly argued that they are not
constitutionally required to do S0.76 Nor is consolidation aided
by retaining such outmoded provisions as a rule which limits the
subpoena powers of a federal court to that limited area cover77
ing a radius of 100 miles.

On the progress side, however, two far-reaching proposals
should be discussed in detail. The first has recently been enacted into law and had been operating by authority of the Judicial Conference of the United States for some time. The second
is a new proposal still under consideration in the United States
Senate.
MULTI DISTRICT LITIGATION ACT

The Multi District Litigation Act,7 8 in the words of its pre73 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1964).
74 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b); Berman v. Herrick, 30 F.R.D. 9

(E.D. Pa.

1962).
75 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

'6See Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations in Diversity
Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 752 (1964).
77 FED. R. Civ. P. 45 (e).
7s28 U.S.C.A. §1407 (Supp. July, 1968).
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amble, provides "for the temporary transfer to a single district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings of civil actions pending in different districts which involve one or more

common questions of fact.

.

. ."7

Known in the 90th Congress

as Senate Bill 159, it was finally approved and effective as of
April 29, 1968. The Act gives statutory authority to the previously operative Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts.
The potential breadth of its application is noted in the legislative history:
The types of cases in which massive filings of multidistrict litigation are reasonably certain to occur include not only civil antitrust
actions but also, common disaster (air crash) actions, patent and
trademark suits, products liability actions and securities law violation actions, among others.80
The new law provides for a panel of federal judges on multidistrict litigation, which panel shall consist of seven circuit and
district judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United
States. In essence the Act provides that when civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, the actions may be transferred by the judicial
panel on multidistrict litigation to any district for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings upon the panels' determination that such transfers will be for the convenience of the parties
and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of
such actions. The transfer may be initiated by the Committee
on its own motion or by motion filed with the Committee by a
party to an action in which consolidation may be appropriate.
It is important to note that this new legislation disregards
forum jurisdictional limitations and weighs only the factor of
the basic convenience of the participants and the just and efficient disposition of the actions.
The coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall
be conducted by a judge or judges to whom such actions are
assigned by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. Upon
completion of the consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings the cases are to be returned to the original district. (The
supporters of the legislation presume, of course, that many of
these matters will be settled after pretrial proceedings and before being returned to the original district.)
Just prior to the final passage of the Act; the Anti-Trust
Law Section of the American Bar Association illustrated the
growing need for the legislation in a report urging its adoption :81
79 Id.
80 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1052.
81 A.B.A. REP. No. 2 OF

THE SECTION OF ANTI-TRUST LAW, RECOMMENDA-

TION OF THE SECTION OF ANTI-TRUST LAW TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON S. 159, 90th CONGRESS, 7 (1968).
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Finally, in the almost three years since this bill was first introduced a great many new facts have come to our attention tending
to support the need for this legislation. Many of these facts were
brought to our attention by members of the Judicial Conference.
And many of the factors supporting the need for the legislation
arise outside the antitrust field, where the electrical equipment
antitrust cases were originally said to justify the need for the bill.
For example, many cases for personal injuries and wrongful death
arising out of a single airplane accident have been filed in multiple
the common fact issues of the cause of an airdistricts involving
8 2
plane accident.

The report of the Anti-Trust Section refers to the report of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary for an explanation of
how the then pending Senate Bill 159 would operate. Important
from the viewpoint of this article are the factors to be weighed
in the selection of the transferee district. The Judiciary Committee report states that the factors to be weighed should include:

the state of the court's docket; the availability of counsel and
the availability of courtroom facilities. The Anti-Trust Section
adds the following observations:
We assume that other factors will also be considered and that equal
weight will be given to the extent to which the transferee district
is centrally located to the district from which the largest number
availability of airplane
of cases are transferred as well as the
83
transportation to the transferee district.

Consideration of these factors should result in the referral
of these cases by the Coordinating Committee to large metropolitan centers where counsel, courtroom facilities and conven-

ient transportation services are available.
THE AVIATION TORT ACT
An even more important series of bills have been introduced by Senator Tydings and are presently before the Senate
These bills vest in the United
Committee on the Judiciary. 4
States District Courts exclusive jurisdiction over all actions
seeking damages for injury or loss of property or death caused
by the negligent, tortious or wrongful act or omission arising
out of, or in the course of, aviation activity. They also include
a number of somewhat revolutionary concepts, all of which sup-

port the propositions advanced herein.

First, the airline may

be sued anywhere it does business or may be found, Without regard to diversity jurisdiction; second, the action may be brought

in any judicial district without regard to venue or process; and,
third, when actions arising out of the same occurrence are
brought in more than one district or division all such actions
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
84 S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968).
82

83
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are first to be collected in one district and division by transferring all others to the district and division wherein a larger
number of such actions are pending or, if there is no such district or division, to the district or division in which the earliest
filed action is pending. When such actions have been collected
in one district and division the court there may retain them and
proceed as if they were originally brought there (presumably
through final disposition) or it may further transfer any or all
of them or otherwise order separate trials on any claims or
issues.
To be fully effective a few revisions are suggested. First,
the provision that all cases be transferred to where the first
were filed or the most are pending could be improved. For
example, suppose after a mass tragedy the first case was filed
in San Diego, California, the most (three) were pending in Los
Angeles, and fifteen others were scattered throughout northeastern districts. As the act is presently written, the fifteen northeastern cases would be transferred to either San Diego or Los
Angeles when an eastern district would be a much more logical
and convenient forum for the parties involved. Amendments
should be offered adopting the criteria presently in effect for
pretrial consolidation under the Multi District Litigation Act
for transfer and disposition.
Second, the legislation should not be limited to injury or
death caused by aviation activity, but should include all mass
catastrophies involving interstate transportation (e.g., rail and
bus transportation).
With these revisions and working in conjunction with the
Multi District Coordinating Committee the mass catastrophe
cases like the protracted commercial cases will naturally and appropriately gravitate to the litigation centers.
CONCLUSION

The trend to expand state court jurisdiction is expected to
continue through liberal interpretation of the various long arm
statutes, particularly in tort cases and by recognition of the insurance carrier as the real party in interest in actions where a
defendant is insured. Most defendants in protracted or multiparty cases will be amenable to suit in many large metropolitan
areas where their products are consumed or where they or their
insurer does business.
Through the transfer and consolidation of related cases
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Multi
District Litigation Act, and in the future, the Aviation Tort Act,
and pursuant to interstate transfer provisions adopted for state
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courts, more cases will be transferred to metropolitan centers
which are more convenient from the standpoint of transportation and facilities and better suited from the standpoint of experience and expertise.
The net result is that these centers will develop into litigation capitols particularly capable of disposing of the protracted
case.

